On 5th November, 2026 the Hon’ble Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh, presided over by the Hon’ble Chief Justice, allowed a review petition and granted leave to appeal in a long-running employment dispute under the Bangladesh Labour Act, 2006 (“Act”). Gladius & Co. appeared for the petitioner, a leading petroleum marketing company listed in the Stock Exchange in Bangladesh and whose majority shares are held by Bangladesh Petroleum Corporation a state owned enterprise.
The order sends the matter for a full appeal hearing. It also gives the Apex Court an opportunity to settle a question of considerable legal and practical importance: how far an employer’s power extends to terminate its employees by simple notice, and what limits the Act places on it. Background to the dispute
The dispute concerns a long-serving employee of the company, who joined in the early 1990s and was confirmed in service after his probationary period. Over the years he also held elected office in the workplace trade union and later contested elections for the collective bargaining agent (CBA), the body that represents workers in dealings with the management. In the CBA election held in 2008, he stood for General Secretary and was not elected.
In 2009, the company ended his employment by notice under Section 26(1) of the Act. The notice alleged no misconduct, and he was paid the benefits the Act provides on termination. At the time, a separate complaint by the employee about a change in his pay grade was pending before the concerned Labour Court. He then went on to challenge the termination, arguing that it was a dismissal in disguise, issued to penalise his union activities and in breach of the protection that applies while a labour court case is pending. The company’s case was that this was a termination simpliciter, a simple termination by notice rather than a punishment, unconnected with union activity. The Labour Court accepted that position, and the Labour Appellate Tribunal upheld it. In 2024, however, the High Court Division set both decisions aside in judicial review proceedings and directed the company to reinstate the employee with arrear benefits, some fifteen years after the termination. Aggrieved by the decision of the Hon’ble High Court Division, The company moved the Hon’ble Appellate Division which refused to grant leave to appeal and subsequently civil review petition was filed where the Apex Court upon review of the High Court Judgment granted leave to file Appeal and stayed the High Court Judgment in the mean time.
The questions before the Court At its centre, the case asks whether an employer may lawfully end a worker’s employment by a simple notice of termination, without alleging misconduct and without first obtaining the Labour Court’s permission, where a labour court case between the parties is pending. Section 26 recognises the employer’s right to terminate by notice, while Section 228 restricts an employer’s ability to act against a worker while certain proceedings are pending.
The company’s case is that the permission requirement in Section 228 arises only where a conciliation proceeding is pending between the parties, and that none was pending here. It also relies on decisions of the Apex Court recognising an employer’s right to terminate by a simple order, provided the purpose is not to penalise a worker for trade union activities. That proviso cuts both ways. Protection against victimisation is a cornerstone of labour law, and nobody disputes it. The practical question is where the ordinary exercise of the termination power ends and victimisation begins. In their argument the company relied on the decision reported in S.H. Quddus v. Chairman, Labour Court, 33 DLR (1981) 5, where it was held that, quite apart from the statutory provision on termination, an employer has an inherent power to terminate a servant’s service on payment of certain benefits and, in the absence of mala fide, the court should not interfere with its exercise. Because the employer must pay pecuniary benefits, the Court said, the exercise of the power cannot be assailed as arbitrary.
Several related questions arise with it: how widely “trade union activities” should be read, and whether standing in a CBA election falls within the phrase; how far the High Court Division may revisit the Labour Court’s findings of fact in writ proceedings; and whether reinstatement with full arrears remains practicable after so many years during which the employee was out of his regular employment under the employer. S.H. Quddus also bears on this last question. The Court there rejected the contention that reinstatement must follow every time a dismissal is set aside, observing that the Labour Court is invested with “abundant discretionary power to allow termination benefits to a worker instead of reinstatement in the circumstances of a particular case”. In S.M. Quddus v. Chairman, Labour Court, Ctg., 33 DLR (AD) (1981) 12, the Labour Court had set aside the dismissal of three employees but, noting a lack of confidence in them, directed termination benefits instead of reinstatement. The Appellate Division rejected the argument that this went beyond section 25 of the Employment of Labour (Standing Orders) Act, 1965, which lets the Labour Court pass such orders as it deems just and proper, and held that the Labour Court’s reasons sufficiently justified termination benefits in place of reinstatement.
Why the review order matters: Review is an exceptional remedy. The Appellate Division does not revisit its own orders lightly, and the grounds on which it will do so are narrow. At the hearing, the Court rejected an application seeking dismissal of the review petition, then allowed the petition and granted leave to appeal. That sequence shows the Court considered the questions raised serious enough to warrant a full hearing. Significance for employers, workers and practitioners.
The eventual ruling is likely to matter well beyond the parties. For employers, public and private, it will clarify whether a notice of termination under Section 26 stands on its own, or whether it can be undone because another proceeding happens to be pending. That affects how terminations are structured and how safely the statutory power can be relied on. It also stands to clarify what amount to trade union activities under the governing laws of Bangladesh, merely taking part in union activities on a day to day basis suffices being involved in trade union activities affording protection of section 228 of the Act? Does that automatically then interpret no employee can be let go as soon as he/she establishes he is involved some sort of trade union activities in an establishment.
For workers and trade unions, the case concerns the strength of the safeguards against termination used as victimisation. A clear statement from the Appellate Division on Section 228, and on the conditions attached to the employer’s right to terminate, would also give the Labor Courts and the Labor Appellate Tribunal firmer guidance in the many disputes of this kind that come before them.
For Gladius & Co., this outcome marks a significant milestone in our labour and employment practice and reflects our commitment to delivering effective, strategic and commercially focused legal solutions. Securing review and leave to appeal before the Appellate Division, in a matter of real consequence for a leading state-owned enterprise, shows the value of thorough preparation and sound legal judgment at every stage of a dispute.